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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
CENTRALIZED AND DISTRIBUTED DETECTION OF COMPROMISED
SMART GRID DEVICES USING MACHINE LEARNING AND
CONVOLUTION TECHNIQUES
by
Cengiz Kaygusuz
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor A. Selcuk Uluagac, Major Professor
The smart grid concept has further transformed the traditional power grid into a
massive cyber-physical system that depends on advanced two-way communication
infrastructure. While the introduction of cyber components has improved the grid,
it has also broadened the attack surface. In particular, the threat stemming from
compromised devices pose a significant danger: An attacker can control the devices
to change the behavior of the grid and can impact the measurements or damage
the grid equipment. In this thesis, to detect such malicious smart grid devices, we
propose a novel machine learning and convolution-based framework, named PowerWatch, that can run in centralized and distributed settings. After gathering library
and system calls, the framework is able to identify how close the observed device
is behaving with respect to its normal operations, with mispredictions implying
compromise. We evaluated the framework through a state-machine-based computational model of the smart grid devices that explore a wide variety of possible cases
that may occur in grid operations: attaining 95.1% accuracy at 0.03% false positive
rate over 37500 experiments. The framework was then further tested on a realistic
smart grid testbed, where it was able to successfully detect the compromised device
in every attack scenario considered in the threat model.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The ability to sense and react to what is happening in the power grid by smart
devices in real time has revolutionized the power industry; by measuring the grid
parameters, smart grid devices can control the electrical grid much more safely and
efficiently than ever before [FMXY12, YQST13]. Indeed, the introduction of smart
devices into the power grid has been a good step in the name of modernization. However, it has also brought challenging security problems that threaten the availability
of such a critical infrastructure [WL13].
One of the most vital security problems in the power domain involves compromised smart grid devices [MKB+ 12]. A compromised device is a device operating
in a smart grid environment, the behavior of which is altered in an unauthorized
fashion. The damage a compromised device may inflict can be summarized as an
unauthorized modification causing undefined behavior, inflicted by either an insider
or outsider party. Within the context of the smart grid, undefined behavior directly
implies a severe risk of unavailability of electricity, a threat which must be addressed.
Dangers of compromised devices are best exemplified through a malicious actor.
Attacks conducted by such entities to the grid devices may yield dire consequences:
A compromised device with sensors that measure the behavior of the power grid may
send false information that may cause the control device to raise the voltage, possibly
overloading and knocking the grid out in case of a coordinated attack. Similarly,
a malicious activity on a control device may accomplish the same hazard directly,
again, making electricity unavailable [GBG+ 11, BAU17]. To ensure a healthy supply
of such a critical resource, the devices must be ensured to behave as expected.
On the other hand, compromised devices may operate in the grid even without
explicitly malicious actions: a counterfeit device swapped in place of an original one
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may also be considered a compromised device. Since this device has not been verified
for correct behavior, it may behave differently in certain situations compared to its
authentic counterpart. In more extreme cases, the device may even fail altogether.
The modern computation takes place over an operating system (OS). The OS
as a whole provides an abstraction layer which presents a uniform interface to the
applications and programs, allowing the same logic to be run across multiple devices
with zero to minimal modification. This abstraction is great in breadth as any
meaningful action such as communication over a network, or requesting space on
memory must be accomplished through the OS. The procedures requested from the
OS is named as system calls. In a similar vein, a program logic often calls procedures
from another corpus of logic called libraries for arbitrary computation to allow for
more efficient development. The use of individual pieces of logic in another library
is named as library call. Indeed, the oft use of the library and system calls enables
one to characterize a program; utilizing this data for intrusion detection has been a
subject of research since Kosoresow’s initial work [KH97].
To address the problem of compromised devices using the insight provided by
call lists, in this paper, we propose a novel framework, named PowerWatch, to detect
compromised devices in a smart grid environment. After collecting the system and
library call lists from a monitored device, the framework attempts to predict the
next call using calls preceding it. The result of this process is then convoluted by an
overlapping integral kernel of a predefined size, a technique inspired by convolutional
neural networks [Sch15]. The convolution step yields a value named as activity
signal, intuitively indicating how close the observed device is behaving to the ground
truth. The signal is then merely subjected to a configurable threshold: if the signal
exceeds the threshold at any given point, then it is decided that the device has been
compromised.
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We tested and evaluated the framework through a finite-state machine based
computational model of the smart grid devices. This model is established with the
critical observation that smart grid devices operate in repetitive behavior that is
triggered periodically or events such as measurement report or actions to control
the grid. The identified state machine is then utilized to generate call lists that are
representative of the behavior of grid devices. A total of 37500 experiments were
conducted with different parameters such as variables dealing with framework configuration, and ones that represent scenarios that may arise during the operations
of the smart grid devices. This corpus of data was both used to analyze how the
framework’s performance are varying with respect to its configurable values. The
results of the extensive evaluation have yielded 95.1% accuracy at 0.03% false positive rate. The framework was further tested to detect attack scenarios on a smart
grid testbed where it was successful in detecting different attacks while being able
to pinpoint when the devices have become compromised.
To account for the different use cases that may arise in the monitoring of the
smart grid, the framework is proposed to be deployed in three distinct configurations.
In stand-alone mode, the detection framework runs on the kernelspace of the device
itself, suitable for monitoring singular devices. In centralized mode, collected call
lists are sent to a dedicated, centralized cloud environment, offering high reliability
and low overhead on grid devices. In distributed mode, devices with low computation
capacity send their call lists to devices with high computation capacity, suitable
for grid devices that have extra computational power, enabling PowerWatch to be
operational without any additional hardware costs.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
The related work chapter is divided into three sections: smart grid security, hostbased anomaly detection, and distributed systems. The layout of this section is also
representative of the s
The current research concerning the safety of the smart grid focused on protection against specific threats. Proposed solutions mostly focus on the mitigation of
false data injections, though there are also a few studies conducted on the behavioral
analysis of smart grids.
The general theme of detecting false data injections is through conducting anomaly
analysis over data that is sent back and forth between auxiliary data-collecting units
and central decision-making devices. Liang et al. [LZL+ 17] has made a review of
such attacks. In [SG14], authors examine how an automatic generation control
(AGC) unit can be overloaded through erroneous data, and propose a solution that
operates by measuring the divergence from the forecast. In [KT13], authors consider
an adversary model that is based on misleading the control center into operating in
a different grid topology than what is deployed, through man-in-the-middle attacks;
it is mitigated by comparing and contrasting data obtained from various devices in
the grid. In [LED+ 14], a solution based on sparse matrix optimization is proposed,
acting on the insight that individual measurements tend to correlate, whereas malicious ones stand on their own. In [KP11], rather than proposing a detection scheme,
authors show that it is possible to make the grid immune to data injection attacks
if a particular subset of measurement units are guaranteed to send authentic data.
Moghaddass et al. conducts anomaly analysis through distribution fitting over the
data that comes from smart grid infrastructure [MW18]. Matthews et al. propose
a large scale analysis of phase measurements using MapReduce techniques [ML18].
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Manandhar et al. detected false data injections into the grid using Kalman filters
[MCHL14]. In [CBLM17], a network-based anomaly detection scheme, is proposed
using off-the-shelf IoT devices in the grid. Wang et al. focus solely on detecting
anomalies arising from PMU’s using statistical methods [WLX+ 17].
We acknowledge that protection against false data injections is of utmost importance, though it is a partial answer to the compromised device problem. An
adversary can conduct a false data injection by altering the behavior of the measurement units, which can only detect compromised measurement devices, leaving
central devices out. The compromise of the central devices is a non-negligible possibility, and it is self-evident that they cannot be detected by inspecting the data
they receive.
As mentioned before, a multitude of studies has been conducted using behavioral
analysis. An artificial neural network based solution is proposed to detect malicious
acts of voltage control [Kos16] by using photovoltaic power production and weather
data, though the corpus of data and the techniques used are specific to solar power
production plants. In [SGLL13], researchers employ a rule-based detection mechanism, where rules are determined manually by humans, which is an erroneous source
that can be eliminated. Berthier et al. use a particular device’s specifications to
construct a detector [BS11], which is a solution that does not easily generalize into
different devices. The solution proposed by Hong et al.

[HLG14] utilizes host-

based information in addition to the network, though the host-based information
depends on events that could be recorded on the device and, again, cannot be easily
generalized into different classes of devices.
Differences from existing work: To the best of our knowledge, the proposed
framework, PowerWatch is the first work to tackle the compromised device problem
in smart grids in a holistic manner focusing on the behavior of the devices with
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system call sequencing, ML, and convolution techniques. Some of the prior art on
the smart grid security touches this problem without identifying it; as a result, their
solutions do not generalize to a wide variety of circumstances that are considered
in this study. In addition to the generalization advantage, our proposed framework
utilizes machine learning algorithms and convolution mechanisms in a novel way.
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CHAPTER 3
PRELIMINARIES
This chapter provides the background information about the problem domain,
smart grid, the adversary model, and the approach to remedy them along with its
assumptions.

3.1

Smart Grid

The term Smart Grid refers to the enhanced version of the electrical grid that
improves on its efficiency flexibility. It does not refer to a new invention that replaced
the existing traditional grid in a short timespan, but rather smoothly evolved from
the previous mechanisms that were in place. Table 3.1 gives a good overview of the
differences between the traditional and the form of a grid that is dubbed as smart.
Table 3.1: A comparison of traditional and smart grid. [Far10]
Concept
Control
Communication
Power Generation
Structure
Sensing
Awareness
Recovery
Flexibility
Testing
Customer Options

Traditional Grid
Electro-mechanical
One-Way Communication
Centralized Generation
Hierarchical
Few Sensors
Blind
Manual Restoration
Failures and Blackouts
Manual Check/Test
Few Customer Choices

Smart Grid
Digital
Two-Way Communication
Distributed Generation
Network
Sensors Throughout
Self-Monitoring
Self-Healing
Adaptive and Islanding
Remote Check/Test
Many Customer Choices

The advent of the electrical grid predates computation devices by more than
half a century. Before the availability of such devices, the grid was managed by
electro-mechanical means. Each entity within the grid was operating independently
and blindly. Any anomaly that happened within the grid affected a large portion of
it, required human intervention, which is slow compared to electronic devices.
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Many of the improvements to the grid that are listed in the later entries in the
Table 3.1 has been possible as a result of the improvements in the former entries;
namely, the digitization, two-way communication structure made possible by the introduction of the computer networks. However, it also introduced previously known
security problems associated with the digital devices into the grid. While this tradeoff has been to the benefit of the grid, the introduced security problems must be
appropriately addressed to ensure the grid is always operational.
The scholarly investigation of smart grid weaknesses has been a busy topic, so
that novel attacks are discovered continuously. In [TSS+ 18], authors discovered a
novel attack that a handful of strategically manipulated measurement results could
drastically alter electricity pricing. Chung et al. [CLY+ 18] propose an attack that
combines both cyber and physical aspects of the smart grid to mask line outages
and alter the grid topology information in the central systems. A particular attack
proposed in 2014 [LCZ+ 14] makes use of multiple compromised circuit switches to
cascade a local failure in the grid.

3.2

Adversary Model

We consider an adversary that can perform unauthorized modification of a device.
The space of all such threats are vast enough not to permit individually addressing
them; however, we hypothesize that all of them, by, definition, involves the modification of the logic in execution, hence could be discovered by spotting anomalies in
the execution. To serve as an example, the space of all threats can be grouped into
three categories:
• Direct grid control with specific commands: A compromised command and
control device such as an IED (Intelligent Electronic Device), may allow the
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attacker - internal or external - to issue commands directly to affect the state
of the grid. Hijacking the control of an IED is an example of such an attack.
• Indirect grid control via fake measurements: A compromised measurement
unit may send fake measurements to exert control over the smart grid indirectly. Poisoning measurements are one way to accomplish this kind of effect.
• Surveillance of sensitive data: A compromised device may allow an insider
or external third-party to gather sensitive, confidential data; namely, leak
information about the state of the grid by using the communication capabilities
of the devices.
The adversary may modify a device by the following means:
• Online: The adversary may remotely connect to a device and modify it.
• Offline The adversary may physically interact with the device to modify it.
These examples illustrate what an adversary may achieve by unauthorized modification. We ultimately assume that any unauthorized modification is potentially
malicious and compromises the smart grid device.

3.3

Device Model

A key observation about smart grid devices is that certain parts of the programs
they are running are repetitively executed [TBAC11, BAU17]: They respond to the
events they receive in the smart grid in a deterministic fashion. Figure 3.1 gives
an example of the operations of an IED represented as a state machine. The figure
exemplifies the fact that the device stays idle for most of the time: on detecting a
frequency anomaly, the device conducts necessary computation to trip the circuit
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Figure 3.1: An example of operation of smart grid devices.
breaker. Likewise, on detecting higher than nominal voltage, the device again does
the computation to lower the voltage; essentially behaving in a ”reactive” fashion.
Such a reactive nature is inherent in all kinds of devices capable of computation that
operate for extended periods and can be generalized into other smart grid devices
as well. Figure 3.2 presents a generalization of these smart grid devices as a state
machine. The number of states represents a different kind of actions a device can
take. This abstract model of smart grid devices is used both in the call trace analysis
and evaluation extensively.
Another observation is that in ordinary operation, the device strictly operates in
known deterministic states; in other words, the capabilities and tasks of a smart grid
device are well known a priori. If a smart grid device is compromised, a previously
unknown state is added to the device.
In the first sight, it is not evident that previously unknown behavior - however
it is measured - would imply the device had been compromised. Unknown behavior
implies a compromised device in a specific context. Such an event is similar to a
user running a previously unknown program on her personal computer. The same
logic cannot be applied in such a situation to detect whether the user’s computer is
compromised; the main difference lies in the fact that a user may run an arbitrary
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Figure 3.2: The generalization of smart grid devices as a state machine. Two states
for voltage and circuit breaking is given as an example. Many more states may be
present in a grid device.
program in her computer, while the smart grid environment does not offer such
a feature. In the case of smart grid devices, since the logic executed in smart
grid devices are well known before they are operational, and this logic is strictly
controlled by the utility or an authorized device vendor, any code execution profile
that diverges from the known implies the device has been compromised.
The framework also assumes that the known behavior is deterministic: It translates well into the context of this study as, known states output known call lists.
The determinism is one of the fundamental concepts that enable a device to be engineered in the first place: if the device would respond chaotically to stimuli, then
it cannot be used to achieve a task, e.g., controlling the voltage level.
Non-determinism in computer logic is nearly always the result of multithreading,
and in rare cases, the presence of quantum phenomena [LJL+ 10] which can be safely
disregarded as smart grid devices does not exhibit quantum behavior. The multithreaded non-determinism must be considered as grid devices may be implemented
in such a fashion, in which case the obtained call lists will be out-of-order and
lose most of its characteristic information. Fortunately, this problem can easily be
circumvented if we consider individual threads, which are strictly deterministic.
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Figure 3.3: A selection of system calls for Windows and Linux operating systems.

3.4

System and Library Calls

The modern computation takes place through an operating system (OS). An OS
is a gigantic abstraction layer that orchestrates a device’s operation and provides
a unified and standardized interface for utilizing device resources, such as disk,
network, memory, and many others. Figure 3.3 gives a list of example system calls
and their functionality for two operating systems.
It is unfeasible to not use system calls, as making any kind of action other than
pure computation such as reading a file from disk, allocating-deallocating additional
memory, communicating with other devices on the network, and using abstractions
such as memory sharing, communicating with other processes etc. require a system
call to be made. It is essential for authentic programs as well as adversarial actors
to use system calls; a program that is disallowed to use them are necessarily only
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capable of performing arithmetic operations at the machine level. Such programs
could be safely ignored as the connected nature of the smart grid at least requires
a device to use its networking capabilities, which mandates the use of system calls.
Library calls, as its name suggests, are function calls that are made to use the
functionality of a shared library, a collection of commonly used operations. The
most commonly used shared library is the standard C library, which provides functionalities like comparing byte segments, mathematical functions, and operations
such as sine, cosine, and square root, and the means of receiving input and giving output. Conceptually, a program may not use any shared library to operate.
In practice, however, shared libraries are one of the staple practices that help to
deliver fast and maintainable software. Besides, it is also a standard practice to
use the standard C library to invoke system calls as for many of them; numerous
data structures must be instantiated, which is tedious and error-prone. The shared
libraries are used widely in practice, and the mandating the use of them bear no
constraints on the viability of library calls.
The system and library call lists (collectively to be referred to as call lists hereafter) are artifacts that could be utilized to map a program to the abstract state
machine depicted in Figure 3.2. The critical observation to be made here is that,
since system and library calls have to be utilized in order for a device to do any
meaningful computation, the states can be identified by the calls they make. An example of a trace of library calls belonging to a program implemented in libiec61850
is given in Figure 3.4. It can be seen that after the initialization period, the program
executes strlen, sendto, and usleep repeatedly in a recognizable pattern.
The states need not be uniquely identifiable as it is not the ultimate goal of
this study. Instead, we are interested in whether the device has operated in a state
that has not been present before, and it is assumed that the state is potentially
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Figure 3.4: An example of library calls taken by: strlen, sendto, malloc, and more.
malicious. At this point, it is natural to ask what happens if the malicious state
outputs the same type of call lists. In this case, the malicious state is strictly
constrained to imitate one of the constrained states. For example, in the example
given in Figure 3.4, an adversarial agent cannot establish a connection to a remote
server to receive commands, which requires a socket or equivalent system call to
be made, which would be detected right away.
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CHAPTER 4
INVESTIGATION OF CALL LIST PATTERNS
Two call lists are finite sequence of symbols which could be compared elementby-element to establish their equivalence. However, direct equivalence is of little
use since a device’s computation history may differ from observation to another a
multitude of factors, such as time of observation, device’s initial state, and events
within the real world. However, if we measure the same device unaltered, there are
some similarities in the patterns of computation.
Even though exact equality cannot be used, the categories of equality can be
used to extract statistical information to form a basis of similarity between two
call lists. The equality of call lists can be broken down into three categories: type,
number, and order of calls. In this chapter, we aim to formally define the metrics
of type, number, and order of call lists, and reason how they can be utilized in
detecting anomalies in them.

4.1

Definitions
malloc
SD

malloc

,

malloc

f ree

!
= 0.

(4.1)

f ree

f ree

Set Distance SD(L1 , L2 ) is the measure of how two call lists are different from
each other according to the type of calls they inhibit. Let A be the set of calls in
L1 , and B the set of calls in L2 . The function SD(L1 , L2 ) is simply the number of
unique elements (cardinality) that is contained in A, but not in B. Formally stated,
SD(L1 , L2 ) = |A − B|. Note that SD(L1 , L2 ) 6= SD(L2 , L1 ). Equation 4.1 gives an
example where SD = 0.
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malloc
LD

f ree !

malloc , f ree
malloc

= 0.

(4.2)

f ree

Length Distance LD(L1 , L2 ) is simply the difference of number of system calls
contained by two call lists. LD = 0 indicates two call lists are of the same length,
while LD 6= 0 indicates one list is longer than another by given amount, without
specifying which one it is. Equation 4.2 gives an example where LD = 0. Note that
LD(L1 , L2 ) = LD(L2 , L1 ).

ED
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f ree
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f ree

malloc

f ree

f ree

!
= 0.

(4.3)

Euclidean Distance ED(L1 , L2 ) is a measurement unit that intermixes both
type and length difference between two call lists. vLi is an N dimensional vector
where each dimension is mapped to total number of calls made to that particular
system or library function belonging to call list Li . With this definition, ED(L1 , L2 )
is simply equal to |vL1 − vL2 |, or ED(L1 , L2 ) = |vL1 − vL2 |. Equation 4.3 gives an
example where ED = 0.

HD
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malloc

f ree
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f ree

malloc

f ree

f ree

!
= 2.

(4.4)

Hamming Distance HD(L1 , L2 ) is simply the number of operations required
to be undertaken in order to make two call lists identical. Note that HD(L1 , L2 ) = 0
implies two lists are identical. Equation 4.4 gives an example where HD = 2.
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4.2

Direct Use of Distance Metrics

An obvious insight is to use these metrics directly to spot differences in the call
lists; however, this is not possible due to problems with device determinism. While
the devices themselves are strictly deterministic, it is not possible to predict all of
the real world situations in a deterministic fashion. For example, it is well defined
what an IED will do if it spots a phase anomaly, or receives a data packet from a
particular sensor, but it is not feasible to calculate ahead-of-time the order of these
events happening (if they happen at all), and the direct use of these metrics require
a rigid determinism as in the example.
The state machine given in Figure 3.2 can be used to clearly illustrate the problems with direct use. Suppose that the machine operates under the following terms:
• The machine operates in turns.
• At each turn, the machine transitions to one of the states except the initial
and the terminal state.
• After the transition, the state machine outputs a call list.
• On performing a certain number of turns, the machine halts by transitioning
to the terminal state.
To permit direct use, one must possess two pieces of critical information: the
total amount of turns the machine is going to operate, and all of the states which
the machine is going to transition at each turn, both of which are not possible to
predict reliably.

17

4.3

Statistical Use of Distance Metrics

The effect of the individual computing states exerts a bias in the call list produced
by the machine that could be measured using statistical methods. For example,
if we consider two states, one of which produces double the amount of one of the
particular call, and the activation probabilities of those two states are the same,
then the state machine which has the mentioned state will contain the call more on
average. Following is a list of difference metrics and their explanations:
• SD(LM , LC ) 6= 0: A call list contains a type of call that is not contained in
the other call list.
• LD(LC , LM ) 6= 0: Two call lists inhibit the same type of calls, but differing in
length.
• ED(LC , LM ) 6= 0: Two call lists are of the same length and contain the same
type of calls, but their internal distributions are different.
• HD(LC , LM ) 6= 0 Two call lists are of the same length, contain the same
type of calls, their internal distributions are the same, but their orders are not
identical.
Two call lists created by the states differing by the first three different cases can
be differentiated by calculating the average of the call counts for each type of call
that may happen. The last case, however, eludes this scheme, as in this case, two
call lists differ only in the order of the calls and harbor no statistical difference.

4.4

Completeness of Hamming Distance

Indeed, the Hamming Distance is complete, in a sense that this metric can calculate
a difference that may be spotted by all of the other methods, in addition to the

18

differences that could only be spotted by this metric. We will now provide proof for
this claim.
Assume that L is the set containing all possible non-empty finite call lists, with
Li , i ∈ N indicating the i th call list of L. Note that for the purposes of this proof,
we are only interested in the fact that ∀i, j ∈ N : i 6= j =⇒ Li 6= Lj .
Lemma 4.4.1 For all pairs of call lists, if their HD is zero, then all other metrics
are also zero:

∀i, j ∈ N HD(Li , Lj ) = 0 =⇒ SD(Li , Lj ) = 0,

(4.5a)

∀i, j ∈ N HD(Li , Lj ) = 0 =⇒ LD(Li , Lj ) = 0,

(4.5b)

∀i, j ∈ N

(4.5c)

HD(Li , Lj ) = 0 =⇒ ED(Li , Lj ) = 0.

Proof. It is sufficient to simply make the following statement:

∀i, j ∈ N HD(Li , Lj ) = 0 ⇐⇒ i = j.

(4.6)

It means the hamming distance is zero only when two lists are equal. Since the
distance of a call list with itself is zero by all metrics, the propositions hold true.

Lemma 4.4.2 For all metrics other than HD (namely, ED, SD, LD) there exist
pairs of call lists such that their distances are 0 under that metric, and greater than
0 in HD.

∃i, j ∈ N : SD(Li , Lj ) = 0 ∧ HD(Li , Lj ) > 0.

(4.7a)

∃i, j ∈ N : LD(Li , Lj ) = 0 ∧ HD(Li , Lj ) > 0.

(4.7b)

∃i, j ∈ N : ED(Li , Lj ) = 0 ∧ HD(Li , Lj ) > 0.

(4.7c)
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Proof. We shall prove each proposition individually, with a generic approach where
we will show in each set whose elements are zero with respect to a metric other than
HD, there exist pairs of call lists which their distance are non-zero under HD.
To prove 4.7a, let S i be the set of all possible non-empty call lists, with Sji is the
j th call list in the set, where members of the set S i have a set distance of 0 to Li :
S i = {Sji : ∀j ∈ N SD(Sji , Li ) = 0}.

(4.8)

The set of Si is of infinite size. Recall that it contains all possible call lists, of
which the only constraint is that they contain at least one type of call that is present
in Li . Since there is not an upper limit on the number of a specific call, it follows
that the set is infinite. Among these call lists of Si , by Equation 4.6 there is only
one call list that HD is zero, and for all others, it yields a nonzero value; hence
Proposition 4.7a holds.
For Proposition 4.7b, we follow a similar procedure. Let Gi be the set of all
possible non-empty call lists, with Gij is the j th call list of Gi , where members of
the set Gi has a length distance of 0 to Li :

Gi = {Gij : ∀j ∈ N LD(Gij , Li ) = 0}.

(4.9)

Let Ti ∈ N be the length of Li , and Oi ∈ N be the number of types of calls of Li .
The following equation

|Gi | = Ti Oi ,

(4.10)

where |.| describes the size of the set Gi . Since both Ti > 1 and Gi > 1, the value
|Gi | = Ti Oi > 0. By Equation 4.6, for only one member of the set Gi yields HD = 0;
hence the equation 4.7b holds.
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For Equation 4.7c, let E i be the set of all possible call lists with Eji is the j th
call list of E i , where all members of the set E i have an euclidean distance of zero to
Li :
E i = {Eji : ∀j ∈ N ED(Eji , Li ) = 0}

(4.11)

Recall that vi ∈ NOi , where each dimension indicates the total amount of calls made
by that particular type of call. The size of the set E i can be described as a wellknown combination problem, concerned with the number of all possible orderings
P
of a total of
i vLi elements, with each element belonging to an element class,
calculated as shown in the following equation.
P
( i vLi )!
|E | = Q
i (vLi !)
i

(4.12)

It is easy to see |E i | > 1 barring trivial cases. By Equation 4.6, only one member
of the set yields HD = 0; thus, the proposition holds.
To summarize the two lemmas: the first lemma indicates if the hamming distance
is zero (i.e., two call lists are of the same pattern), then, it implies they are equal and
cannot be distinguished by any metric. The second lemma indicates there exist call
lists that could only be distinguished by hamming distance, i.e., pattern analysis.
These two indicate that a pattern analysis algorithm can distinguish between every
pair of call lists where such differentiation is possible.
In light of this information, in the next chapter, we describe the detection framework.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ARCHITECTURE OF POWERWATCH FRAMEWORK
This chapter describes the PowerWatch, a framework that processes call traces
with the purpose of identifying compromised devices. The core trace analysis algorithm is described first, followed by the operation modes of PowerWatch, developed
to address different infrastructure requirements.

5.1
5.1.1

Trace Analysis Algorithm
Overview

The general architecture of the framework is given in Figure 5.1. Two principal
phases of the algorithm are described below, followed by the detailed description of
the individual steps.

Training
In this phase, the device is run while being guaranteed not to be compromised, and
its call lists are harvested. These call lists are then pre-processed by a procedure
called bucketing. Using this data, the machine learning model is then trained. Another training step is then conducted to compute the activity index threshold, where
the entire algorithm is run against an authentic device, and the maximum value of
the activity signal is picked as the threshold.

Monitoring
In this phase, the device is deployed into the field and is being monitored through its
call lists. After an adequate amount of calls are harvested, it is first pre-processed
to be fed into the machine learning model. The model is principally used to predict
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Figure 5.1: Flowchart for the call list analysis algorithm.
a call in the list by looking at calls immediately preceding to it. The results of the
predictions are then analyzed; for each call, if the prediction was successful, it is
marked 0, if not, it is marked 1. This array of binary values are then convoluted by
an integral kernel, which sums its values within the convolution window of interest.
If there is a value within the convoluted signal that exceeds the threshold, it is
decided that the device has been compromised.

5.1.2

Detailed Steps

In this section, we detail the major steps given in Figure 5.1.

Harvesting Call Traces
As its name suggests, library and system call lists are harvested at the first stage.
Since the framework records no information other than the type of the call, a call
list can be thought as a sequence of symbols. An extensive study on collecting call
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Figure 5.2: An example of ltrace output.
lists can be found in Lopez’s work [LBAU17]. In this study, we opted to use ltrace,
one of the standard programs when it comes to collecting system or library calls
in the Linux operating system. An example of the ltrace output can be found in
Figure 5.2.
Both system and library calls are traced by ltrace with the invocation of a particular system call, ptrace, which is a mnemonic for process tracing. This system
call is used by ltrace to attach itself to the monitored process, which enables ltrace
to insert a special instruction that temporarily halts the program and notifies an
external process (this instruction is 0xCC in case of Intel architectures). On the notification that the monitored process has been halted, ltrace examines the memory
contents of the process, records the system and library call, and lets the operating
system resume the process.

24

Algorithm 1: Bucketing (Preprocessing) Stage

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

input : system or library call list
output: bucketed call list
begin
Sbucket ← configure()
Swindow ← configure()
T ← configure()
for i ← 1 to input.length - Sbucket do
for j ← 1 to Sbucket - 1 do
R[i][j] ← input[i + j - 1]
R[i].last ← input[i + Sbucket - 1]
return R

Bucketing (Pre-processing)
After the framework obtains the raw data which is a sequence of symbols, they are
arranged in a way that the sequence predictor accepts. The number of calls to be
inspected, i.e., the look-behind value is named as bucket size. In the preprocessed
dataset, each row has bucket size columns, where the last column is the target call,
and the previous columns are previous calls, respectively. The optimal bucket size
value is determined experimentally in the evaluation section. Algorithm 1 outlines
this procedure.

Prediction
At this point, the machine learning model is fed with the preprocessed data, which
then begins to predict each call by looking at previous calls. For each call, if the
prediction was successful, it emits 0, if it fails, 1 is emitted. This process is described
in Algorithm 2.
The choice of specific numbers – 0 for valid predictions, and 1 for invalid predictions – is not intuitive at first sight, since traditionally 0 and 1 represent false
and true, respectively. In our case, PowerWatch essentially measures the diver-
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Algorithm 2: Prediction Stage

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

input : Bucketed Call List
output: Raw Prediction Signal
begin
Sbucket ← configure()
T ← configure()
for i ← 1 to R.length do
Ctarget ← R[i].last
Cpredict ← predict(R[i])
if Cpredict = Ctarget then
P[i] ← 0
else
P[i] ← 1
return P

gence of the program logic execution, with the aim of higher values representing
greater divergence. The numerical value is obtained in the convolution step, which
its explanation will help in understanding this design decision better.

Convolution
Algorithm 3: Convolution Stage

1
2
3
4
5

input : Raw Prediction Signal
output: Activity Signal
begin
TA ← input
for i ← 1 to TA .length − Swindow do
TB [i] ← sum from TA [i] to TA [i + Swindow ]
return TB

As the last step before the decision, the binary signal obtained from the prediction stage is sum-convoluted by an overlapping integral kernel of size called window
size. In other words, the binary signal is iterated through a sliding window of size
window size, wherein each iteration, every element within the window is summed.
Result of this operation is named as activity signal, and each element in the signal
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is called activity index. The mentioned index can also be thought of as an index of
corruption and has a simple and useful property that having a high index indicates
suspicious activity. The optimal window size value is determined experimentally in
the evaluation section. Algorithm 3 outlines this procedure.
Thresholding
The last step is straightforward: if any element within the activity signal exceeds a
threshold, then it is decided that the device is compromised. The threshold is picked
by running the framework on a corpus of call lists that are known to be coming from
an authentic device, but not used to train the sequence predictor.

5.2

Operational Modes

This section discusses the different methods of how PowerWatch may be used. We
propose three different setups: stand-alone, centralized, and decentralized deployment. Different deployment cases are proposed in order to satisfy possible monitoring requirements efficiently, listed as follows:
• Stand-Alone Mode: In this mode, all the tracing steps - from call list harvesting
to thresholding - is done on a device. This is the simplest use case and effective
for monitoring single devices, however, the tracing logic induces an overhead
to the device, and each monitored device is needed to be managed separately.
• Cloud-Assisted Mode: The harvested data is sent to the cloud for processing,
dedicated to this task. This mode induces the least amount of overhead to a
given device, as gathering data and sending it over the network has been found
to be efficient. In addition, a dedicated server cluster ensures the availability of
processing power for the monitoring task, increasing PowerWatch’s reliability.
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Figure 5.3: Standalone deployment scheme of PowerWatch.
These perks come at the cost of increased economic expenses for the cloud
service.
• Distributed Mode: This mode utilizes the binary classification of smart grid
devices, namely resource-rich and resource-limited devices (referred as rich
and limited devices hereafter). The devices which are incapable of running
the tracing logic (limited) send their call lists to rich devices, which possess
adequate resources to handle such a task. As this mode utilizes already existing
devices within the network to conduct the analysis, no additional hardware
expenses are required, however, depending on the resource utilization of the
grid devices, it may not be feasible to use this mode without diminishing the
capabilities of the grid devices.

5.2.1

Stand-Alone Mode

Figure 5.3 outlines the stand-alone operation mode. In this scheme, the module
that conducts the call trace analysis is placed on the device that is being monitored.
Elements of this scheme is explained as follows:
• Monitored Process: As the name clearly indicates, this is the program that is
being monitored. It runs in the userspace, without superuser privileges.
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• Tracer : This module records both the system and library calls from a device.
This module must be implemented at the operating system level (kernelspace)
as the operating system is fool-proof in terms of tracing system calls: no
program without compromising the operating system itself may conceal the
system calls it is making.
• Call List Analyzer : This module executes the call list analysis algorithm described in Chapter 5.
Since the analyzing module is placed on the same device that its integrity is in
question, it is natural to ask why such a setup is employable. Recall that the operating system integrity was one of the assumptions that were made in Chapter 3. The
breach of the operating system is much more complicated than modifying userspace
programs, and once done, it requires hardware-assisted detection methods [WL13]
that requires replacement of the working devices, which our solution is trying to
avoid. Within a device, a small, trusted segment that is capable of computation is
adequate to monitor the rest of the system, which in our case, this segment is the
operating system.

5.2.2

Cloud-Assisted Mode

In this setup, the gathered data is sent from a monitored device to a centralized
cloud system for processing. The details of this scheme is given in Figure 5.4.
The main advantage of the cloud setup is reliability and availability by dedicating
a cluster of hosts specifically for analyzing the call list traces. Its design follows
service-oriented architecture (SOA) [EAA+ 04] patterns. It can be described as a
computation cluster that is accessible behind a reverse-proxy server. The entities
present in the Figure 5.4 are explained as follows:
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Figure 5.4: Cloud-assisted deployment scheme of PowerWatch.
• Device: This is the device that its monitoring is of interest. Differently, from
the stand-alone deployment, it does not processes the call list traces on itself
but sends it to a remote server.
• Detection Cluster : This is a collection of hosts that conducts the call list
analysis.
• Receiver : The reverse-proxy server that is intended as an entry-point to the
analysis system. It can be thought as an application-layer router that forwards
the incoming connection to the relevant subsystem (only the relationship with
the message queue is shown for brevity) or rejects the connection altogether.
• Message Queue: This entity basically distributes the analysis jobs (messages in
terminology) to the processing cluster, and allows for asynchronous processing
for various tasks which improves the responsivity of the system and is a typical
in service-oriented software architectures [EAA+ 04].
• Processing Cluster : Contains the hosts that are dedicated to the call list analysis, and other logic that need to be executed periodically or asynchronously.
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Figure 5.5: Information flow in distributed deployment scheme of PowerWatch.
• Service Cluster : This cluster is dedicated for human access to the state of the
monitoring system. Its resources are completely isolated from the processing
cluster to ensure the system state can be accessed at all times.
• Database: As its name indicates, it holds and persists all the information
relevant to the analysis task, and ordinary application data.
The two clustered parts – service and processing – are done so in order to ensure
availability of computation power. For example, if there is not enough capacity
for call list trace analysis, the near-real-time property of the system is lost, and
a compromised device may be noted much later after its occurrence. In a similar
fashion, if the service cluster is not available, the computed activity index values
may not be able to read from the system, making its purpose nullified.

5.2.3

Distributed Mode

The cloud-assisted deployment scheme requires additional hardware to be functional.
The distributed deployment scheme aims to evade dealing with extra hardware by
utilizing an existing device’s computation power to conduct call trace analysis. More
specifically, the devices are classified into two: resource-rich and resource-limited
(to be referred as rich and limited devices hereafter), with the distinction that rich
devices are capable enough to monitor limited devices. Figure 5.5 illustrates the
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Figure 5.6: In decentralized deployment, rich devices monitor limited devices.
information flow in both between the devices and within the device itself. Figure 5.6
illustrates the idea of rich devices monitoring limited devices.
The distributed scheme requires each device to be able to function independently
(e.g., a rich device should be able to monitor itself and any other limited device
connected to itself even though it knows nothing about other devices), however, the
system still needs to be configurable. To achieve this goal, we intend any rich device
to serve as an entry point to PowerWatch, holding all relevant information to access
the other rich devices in the network.
Before revealing any more information about the details, a shortlist of terminology is given below:
• Resource-Rich Devices: Abbreviated as rich devices, these are computationally
capable devices that are able to carry the monitoring load. Examples of these
devices include IED’s and remote terminal units (RTU’s).
• Resource-Limited Devices: Abbreviated as limited devices, these devices do
not have the computational capability to monitor its own processes and must
send their call lists to a rich device. Simple sensors and logging devices are
examples of limited devices, such as phase measurement units and smart meters.
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• Registry: The distributed database that holds which rich devices are within
the network. A complete copy of this database is shared by all of the rich
devices.
• Peer Server : The peer server is the default server which rich devices synchronize with by default.
• Parent: Every limited device (child) chooses a suitable rich device (parent) so
that they send their call lists to their parent, to have them analyzed for an
anomaly.
• Parent Discovery: Refers to the procedure of finding a suitable parent.
• Synchronization: Refers to the synchronization procedure of rich devices.
• Merge: In the case of partitioning, two or more networks are merged back
together the network problem is solved.
The actions to be taken within the network are as follows:
Peer Discovery refers to the mechanism that enables rich and limited devices
to be aware of its surrounding peers. It is the collection of the two procedures used
by rich and limited devices respectively: synchronization and parent discovery. The
objective of the former is for a rich device to join the rich device network so that
limited devices may discover and choose it as its parent, and for the latter, to find
a parent to send the call lists.
Algorithm 4 describes the selection of a suitable peer for synchronization. A rich
device needs to be synchronized with the rest of the network before it can operate
PowerWatch’s logic, hence synchronization continues as an endless loop until its successful, as can be seen on line 2. The device attempts to synchronize with the peer
server with lines 3 and 4. On line 5, the procedure is terminated if synchronization
were successful. If not, the device attempts to obtain a list of rich devices that are
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Algorithm 4: Synchronization for Rich Devices

1
2
3
4
5
6

input : none
output: successful synchronization
begin
while no synchronization do
peer server ← default peer server
synchronize(peer server)
if synchronization successful then
return

10

local rich peer list ← discoveryBroadcast()
rich peer ← randomly select a peer from peer list synchronize(rich peer)
if synchronization successful then
return

11

exponentialBackoff()

7
8
9

within the same broadcast domain on line 7, randomly selects one of them with line
8, and attempts to synchronize with it on line 9, terminating if the synchronization
is successful on line 10. In case the device is still not synchronized with the PowerWatch deployment, it waits for a period that is exponentially increasing with each
failed synchronization attempt, as shown with line 11.
The exponential backoff algorithm is the standard algorithm for waiting for a predefined amount of time after failure until the attempted operation succeeds. After
each failed operation, the device waits for a time period that increases exponentially
with respect to the number of failures. For this study, it is recommended to wait
for 2n seconds where n is the total number of failures. For example, a device failing
to connect for the 3rd, 4th, and 5th times would wait for 8, 16, and 32 seconds,
respectively, before attempting for connection again. The maximum value for n is
also recommended to be 7 (27 = 128), which limits the maximum waiting time to
a little more than two minutes.
Algorithm 5 describes the procedure for the selection of a suitable parent. Limited devices first seek a parent within the same broadcast domain as choosing the
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Algorithm 5: Parent Discovery for Limited Devices

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

input : none
output: chosen parent
begin
while a parent is not found do
rich peer list ← initializeEmptyList()
rich peer list.append(localRichDiscovery())
rich peer list.append(localLimitedParentDiscovery())
rich peer list.append(peerListFromDefaultServer())
for i ← 0 to rich peer list.length do
rich peer ← rich peer list[i]
chooseParent(rich peer)
if parent choosing successful then
return
exponentialBackoff()
return parent

closest parent would put the smallest overhead to the network. If no parent could
be found, the device then asks the parents of limited devices within the same broadcast domain. If this also fails, it attempts to communicate with the default peer
server. The limited device exponentially backoffs before attempting to begin the
same procedure again.
Algorithm 5 describes the procedure for the selection of a suitable parent. The
device first collects the list of suitable parents in three sources: from devices within
the broadcast domain, the parents of the limited devices within the broadcast domain, and finally, from the peer list obtained from the default server, as seen in lines
from 4 through 6. From line 7 to 11, the device goes through the rich device list in
the order they are obtained, and attempts to choose one as a parent. If the selection
is successful, the procedure terminates, and the device begins sending the call lists
to the parent device. In case to selection happens, the device idles as can be seen on
line 12, for a time period that is exponentially increasing with every idling period,
similar to the peer discovery procedure.
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Synchronization specifically refers to the process that a new rich device inheriting the common database. The principal purpose of this database is to serve as a
registry for rich devices. The specifics of this distributed database is left to the implementation, though in our tests we used rqlite, a distributed version of sqlite that
uses Raft consensus protocol [OO14], which is found in most common distributed
databases.
Merging Partitions is a need arises when a distributed system is divided due
to network error and start to operate as two or more independent systems. After
the error is fixed, the independent clusters need to be joined together to operate as
one again: this process is named as partition merging.
Merger operation is rather straightforward: as the unreachable rich peers are
eliminated from the registry, the remaining records in both clusters are simply joined
together.
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CHAPTER 6
EVALUATION OF POWERWATCH
Evaluation of the trace analysis framework was conducted in two parts: the first
part is based on a state-machine-based model of smart grid devices. This scheme
allowed us to test the framework over a total of 37500 experiments collectively
representing different device and attack complexities that may appear during the
operation of smart grid devices. Using data resulted from the state-machines, we also
determined the optimal values for bucket and window sizes. We further implemented
a realistic smart grid testbed conforming to IEC61850 standards and compromised
a device in three distinct ways while attempting to detect it.

6.1

Methodology of State Machine-Based Experiments

The evaluation of the framework’s performance was conducted on the finite state
machine model of smart grid devices, as shown in Figure 3.2. The model machine
is defined in more depth to allow for experimentation: It is comprised of an initial
and a halting state, a bounded amount of states that were marked as benign, and
optionally, a state that was marked as malicious.
The principles of the state machine operation are stated as follows: The machine
starts at the initial (or idle) state. At each turn, the machine randomly transitions
to any state, except the initial and halting state, with respect to the state transition
probabilities and outputs a call list assigned to that state. After a certain amount
of turns (detailed below), the machine transitions into the halting state, and halts
without outputting any call lists. The benign states had a cumulative state transition probability of 99%, and the malicious state, if present, had the transition
probability 1%. For example, if there were 4 benign states and 1 malicious state,
each benign state has a transition probability of
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99 1
· .
100 4

Furthermore, if the malicious

state is present, it is ensured that the malicious state has been transitioned to at
least once.
In each experiment, a total number of 45 runs were conducted: 15 runs for a
benign machine the results of which were used for training the detector, additional
15 runs for the benign machine, the results of which were used solely for testing the
detector, and final 15 runs for the malicious state machine, namely a state machine
that contained all the states of the benign machine, in addition to a malicious state.
Each run took a total of 500 turns, with a total turn count of 500 × 45 = 22500
turns.
The state machines were randomly generated with respect to 5 parameters which
model a big portion of all possible device and attack complexity that may be realized
during the operation of the smart grid devices and are described as follows:
• Benign state count: Represents how many uniquely identifiable computations
a device may conduct in a non-compromised situation. The benign state
machine inhibits as many states as this parameter indicates.
• Benign state call count: Represents how many calls a benign state may make.
This parameter is sampled separately for every benign state.
• Benign state call dictionary: Represents the diversity in types of calls a benign
state may make, e.g., a benign state call dictionary value of 3 indicates a benign
state makes only 3 different types of calls. Note that this value was an upper
bound: the unique number of calls may be lower than that since the list itself
was also randomly generated.
• Malicious state call count: The same as its benign counterpart, but it was
used solely for the malicious state.
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• Malicious state call dictionary: Again, the same as its benign counterpart,
but it was used solely for the malicious state.
Table 6.1 describes the parameters used in generating the state machine. Each
experiment receives the range of every parameter which it should sample from to
generate the state machine. For every possible combination of parameter ranges, an
experiment was run. The total number of experiments conducted was 37500.
Table 6.1: Parameters for State Machine Generation
Parameter name
Benign state count
Benign state call count
Bucket size
Window size
Benign state call vocabulary
Malicious state call count
Malicious state call vocabulary

6.2

Ranges
[1, 5) [5, 10) [10, 15) [15, 20) [20, 25)
[1, 5) [5, 10) [10, 15) [15, 20) [20, 25)
[2, 8) [8, 32) [32, 128)
[20, 40) [60, 80) [90, 100) [150, 200)
[1, 5) [5, 10) [10, 15) [15, 20) [20, 25)
[1, 5) [5, 10) [10, 15) [15, 20) [20, 25)
[1, 5) [5, 10) [10, 15) [15, 20) [20, 25)

Results

This subsection is dedicated to interpreting the data obtained from state-machinebased smart grid devices. There are two questions to be answered: can the framework successfully detect compromised devices, and if so, what are the best values
for bucket and window sizes?
To assess whether the framework can accomplish its task, Figures 6.1(a) and 6.2(a)
must be examined. In both cases, the framework consistently produces true positive
and true negative values with low false positive and false negatives, which implies
that the framework, indeed, can detect the compromised devices.
Figure 6.1 presents a collection of figures that show the performance of PowerWatch the by bucket size. Figure 6.1(b) clearly illustrates that for each bucket size
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.1: PowerWatch’s performance per bucket size.

(a)

(b)

Figure 6.2: PowerWatch’s performance per window size.

(a)

(b)

Figure 6.3: Required processor times per bucket and window sizes.
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Figure 6.4: Topology of the testbed which attacks were conducted.
value, the framework produced higher activity signal peaks for the compromised
devices (higher activity index implies compromise). Figure 6.1(a) presents the classification performance of the framework: the detection rates stay consistently very
high for all the bucket size values except abnormally low ones. Figure 6.3(a) required computation power scales linearly with the bucket size. Since bigger bucket
sizes require more time, and the detection rate does not change by bucket size except for very low values, the lowest possible bucket size that does not yield inferior
performance must be selected, which in this case, we recommend the value of 10.
On the other hand, Figure 6.2 contains a collection of figures that present the
performance of the framework by the window size. Figure 6.2(b) indicates that
for every tested window size, the framework produced higher activity signal peaks
for compromised devices. Figure 6.2(a) presents the classification performance: the
detection rates slightly tank as the window size grows. Figure 6.3(b) shows the
required computation power scales linearly with the window size in the worst case;
though, even at its worst, it is negligibly low. Since higher window sizes imply
inferior detection rate and increased computation power, a low window size value
must be chosen: in this case, we recommend the value of 25.

6.3

Detecting Attacks in a Real Testbed

The state-machine-based testing and evaluation have allowed us to efficiently enumerate and run our framework against a wide variety of cases that can possibly
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Figure 6.5: Activity signals generated by devices under various attacks.
appear during the operation of smart grid devices. We now present how well the
framework performs under concrete attack scenarios.
This assessment was done under a representative testbed of smart grid devices
which comprised of two devices: a command-and-control (C&C) device, and a measurement device in communication using GOOSE messages. An illustration of this
setup is given in Figure 6.4. These devices were programmed so that the measurement unit supplied data to the (C&C) server, implemented by using the opensource libiec61850 library which provided automatic IEC61850 conformance. For
the command-and-control unit, a control hijacking attack was implemented. The
measurement unit was compromised in two distinct ways: In the first case, the
attacker altered the measurements, and in the second case, the attacker sent the
measurement values to an external server, leaking the sensitive and valuable measurement information to outsiders.
The obtained results are shown in Figure 6.5 for both C&C and measurement
units. In each figure, its activity indexes in both uncompromised and compromised
states are given. As expected, when the device is not compromised, its activity
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Figure 6.6: For overhead analysis, two rich devices were monitoring 40 limited
devices.
index stays zero at all times. Compromising both C&C and measurement units
in each attack scenario produced an activity index that is significantly higher than
zero, indicating PowerWatch is successful in detecting compromised devices.

6.4

Overhead Analysis

The trace analysis algorithm is expected to increase both the computational load
of the devices and the network utilization. It is necessary to quantify this increase
in order to determine whether the algorithm is feasible to deploy. The overhead
analysis is conducted in the decentralized mode as its results can be generalized into
both stand-alone and centralized mode.
The illustration of the device topology for overhead analysis is given in Figure 6.6,
where two rich devices were monitoring a grand total of 40 limited devices, each
individually monitoring 20 devices. Both rich and limited devices were run under
a container using Docker [Ber14]. The rich devices were allowed to use 2 CPU
cores to its full extent, while limited devices were allowed to use 1 CPU core at
2% capacity. Both rich and limited devices were running a program implemented
using libiec61850, with limited devices acting as a sensor unit, and publishing data
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Figure 6.7: CPU utilization with respect to device and its state.
to one of the rich devices. Note that, in this test, limited devices send both GOOSE
messages, which is related to the grid operations, and call list traces for monitoring.

6.4.1

CPU Overhead

Figure 6.7 summarizes the CPU usage percentages, sampled at one-second interval
of the devices during their various configurations, explained below:
• Rich - Normal : Rich devices during their normal operation (no monitoring),
• Rich - Monitoring: Rich devices during monitoring 20 devices,
• Limited - Normal : Limited devices during their normal operation,
• Limited - Monitoring: Limited devices while they are monitoring themselves,
• Limited - Sending: Limited devices while they are sending call traces to rich
devices.
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From the figure, it can be seen that rich devices almost have no load when not
monitoring, and have 2̃0% CPU utilization when monitoring limited devices, which
implies the device can easily monitor devices in addition to its normal duties.
Similarly, in the case of limited devices, their load on normal operations were
measured to be around 4̃0% utilization. When attempting to monitor themselves,
the operation of its normal duties was disrupted, and unprocessed call lists were
piling up. However, sending the call lists to a remote host induced an acceptable
overhead while enabling the device to resume its duties without disruption.

6.4.2

Network Overhead

Network overhead strictly depends on the rate of calls that are being generated by
the grid devices. In the implemented testbed, each device was producing approximately 6 calls per second. The application layer data size was calculated as 61
bytes. Multiplying it with 40 by device number yielded 2440 Byte/s. Considering
the network infrastructure is comprised of gigabit ethernet, the proposed scheme
consumes 1.95 × 10−5 % of the total bandwidth, which is a minuscule number. This
figure shows a commodity network equipment can handle 105 = 10000 devices until
the network usage (approximately 2%) is noticeable.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The transformation of smart grid to include digital devices has introduced the
compromised devices problem, where an adversary may perform arbitrary modification on a device. We proposed to detect such devices by means of anomaly
detection using system and library call lists. We have formally analyzed the capability of call list analysis for this task, proposed a novel algorithm that measures
call list similarity, devised a Monte-Carlo experiment to assess how it behaves in
different circumstances and implemented it to work in a real smart grid testbed.
Our results show that the proposed algorithm is successful in detecting anomalies
in call list patterns and also succeeded in detecting compromised devices in a concrete setting. Lastly, we described how the proposed method could be deployed in
three different setups: stand-alone, where the detection algorithm is operated on
the device, centralized, where the call lists are processed in a centralized server, and
decentralized, where surrounding devices with high computation capacity monitors
the devices with low computation capacity.
The vision of this thesis was to achieve a generalizable detection method for
monitoring smart grids, and the experimental data implies this is accomplished with
a very low false-positive ratio. On a theoretical basis, the detection potential of the
methods presented here are superior to what has been reported in the literature,
since it encompasses a wide variety of vulnerabilities instead of addressing individual
security problems. The investigation of the impact of this theoretical reasoning into
the practice can be accomplished by directly applying the methods of this thesis to
the vulnerabilities that have been reported in the literature. Doing so requires a
significant engineering effort, however, and it is the reason of its omission as we have
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decided focus on the development of the method and its associated experiments.

7.1

Future Work

The concepts introduced within this study can be expanded by the following:
• Utilizing the parameters of system and library calls: Within the scope of this
study, we considered only the name of the system or library call, and omitted the parameters. Even though the results are satisfactory, the usage of
parameters may open new avenues in developing a better detector.
• Data Sources: PowerWatch is a data-driven framework. We utilized system
and library calls to conduct detection; however, the data sources that could be
utilized are not limited to these: any sequential data that is deterministically
generated by the program execution logic may be used as a data source. A
few examples of such data is given below:
– jmp instructions: On the assembly level, system and library calls are
implemented by changing the instruction pointer by either an interrupt
or a call instruction. The jmp family of instructions work in a very
similar fashion, differing only in being simpler as it does not affect the
call stack or processor registers. Tracing jumped address values may offer
higher resolution in tracing a program.
– Instruction Pointer : The values of instruction pointers may be traced to
obtain an even higher resolution data.
– Trace Injection: A program may be injected with code that produces a
specific symbol upon execution. The system and library calls produce a
symbol only upon their invocation; however, the strategic placement of
trace-generating code does not limit the data generation to the locations
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of the system and library calls within the code; the relaxation of this constraint may be examined for positive impact on detection performance.
– System Resource Utilization: The peripheral units of a device may be
traced individually, e.g., by tracing the network interface and the display
of the device separately. Logging discrete actions taken on these devices
improve over system calls as they only contain partial information on how
these devices are used exactly.
• Static Analysis: PowerWatch utilizes a dynamic analysis method - it runs the
program - to obtain the call list patterns. A static analysis approach may be
used to obtain a formal grammar of the call lists, which then could be used
to analyze the call list traces.
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